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Introduction
The emotions that human beings experience play a
fundamental role in all social phenomena. As a result,
sociology needs to incorporate the analysis of emo-
tions into its objects of study. This process, which
began three decades ago with the birth of the sociology
of emotions, must continue advancing until emotions
are fully integrated into the general sociological per-
spective.
This article offers an introductory and critical
overview of the work sociologists of emotions have
carried out so far. These sociologists have helped us,
first of all, to understand what an emotion is, the
countless number of existing emotions, their different
types and the great complexity of emotional process-
es. Second, they have revealed the social nature of
human emotions, the emotional nature of social phe-
nomena and the role that emotions should play in the
discipline of sociology. Third, they have developed a
number of theoretical approaches to studying the
emotions. And, lastly, they have carried out sociologi-
cal analyses of many specific emotions (fear, trust,
shame, etc.), and emotional analyses in many areas of
sociology (gender, work, organizations, social move-
ments, etc.). After presenting these contributions, this
article offers suggestions for the future development
of the sociology of emotions, basic readings for those
wishing to start in this field of study and a comple-
mentary bibliography. 
What are emotions?
We may know what emotions are and understand
their importance from our own experience. In fact, as
human beings we can only experience life emotional-
ly: I feel, therefore I am. However, many questions still
remain regarding their essential nature (Lawler, 1999),
making it difficult to arrive at their satisfactory defini-
tion (Marcus, 2000: 224). The profound complexity
which characterizes human life in the world is reflected
in the broad and subtle universe of emotions. For this
reason, understanding the complex nature of human
emotions is absolutely necessary for the adequate
development of sociology.
Definitions and types of  emotions
Denzin (2009 [1984]: 66) defines emotion as ‘a lived,
believed-in, situated, temporally embodied experience
that radiates through a person’s stream of conscious-
ness, is felt in and runs through his body, and, in the
process of being lived, plunges the person and his
associates into a wholly new and transformed reality –
the reality of a world that is being constituted by the
emotional experience’. For Kemper (1987: 267),
Seymour Epstein’s definition of a primary emotion is
useful: ‘a complex, organized response disposition to
engage in certain classes of biologically adaptive
behaviors ... characterized by a distinctive state of
physiological arousal, a distinctive feeling, or affective
state, a distinctive state of receptivity, and a distinctive
pattern of expressive reactions’. Lawler (1999: 219)
defines emotions as relatively brief, positive or nega-
tive evaluative states, which have physiological, neuro-
logical and cognitive elements. And Brody (1999: 15)
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sees emotions as motivational systems with physio-
logical, behavioural, experiential and cognitive com-
ponents that have a positive or negative valence (they
make one feel good or bad), which vary in intensity
and tend to be induced by interpersonal situations or
events that merit our attention because they affect
our well-being.
Although the general term currently most widely
used is simply that of ‘emotion’, it is important to
distinguish between different classes of affective
states.
Primary emotions are considered to be universal,
physiological, of evolutionary relevance and biologi-
cally and neurologically innate, while secondary emo-
tions, which can be a result of a combination of
primary emotions, are socially and culturally condi-
tioned. According to Kemper (1987), the primary
emotions are fear, anger, depression and satisfaction,
while Turner (1999: 145) identifies them as satisfac-
tion-happiness, aversion-fear, assertion-anger, 
disappointment-sadness and startlement-surprise.
Emotions such as guilt, shame, love, resentment, dis-
appointment and nostalgia are considered to be sec-
ondary emotions.
Gordon (1981: 566–7) distinguishes between
emotions and sentiments, which according to him are
‘socially constructed pattern[s] of sensations, expres-
sive gestures, and cultural meanings organized
around a relationship to a social object’. Lawler
(2001: 326–8) distinguishes between global emotions,
or generic responses to the outcome of an interac-
tion, which are involuntary and not conditioned by
interpretation or cognitive attribution, and specific
emotions, which actors associate with specific objects
and are defined through interpretive effort. Kemper
(1978) also distinguishes between structural, situa-
tional and anticipatory emotions.
Jasper (2011: 286–7) establishes the following
typology of emotions: bodily urges, such as sexual
desire or the need to defecate; reflex emotions, which
are short-term reactions to our immediate environ-
ment, both physical and social, such as anger, fear or
joy; moods, or lasting affective states, not very intense
and lacking a specific object; and reflexive emotions,
like ‘affective loyalties’, such as love, respect and
trust, or ‘moral emotions’, involving feelings of
approval and disapproval.
In short, we can state that emotions constitute the
bodily manifestation of the importance that an event in
the natural or social world has for a subject. Emotion
is a bodily consciousness that signals and indicates
this importance, regulating in this way the relation-
ships that a specific subject has with the world. In its
most basic expression this involves three elements:
(a) the assessment/appraisal; (b) of an event in the
world; (c) made by an individual. 
Without doubt, the ‘self’, the feeling subject, con-
stitutes the central reference upon which emotions
turn. According to Denzin (2009 [1984]), the link-
age of emotion to self is, in essence, a matter of def-
inition. However, it is evident that the nature of
emotions is relational. The concrete emotion that a
subject feels will depend on what the perceived con-
sequences of interactions with others are for the sur-
vival, well-being, needs, goals and personal plans of
the self (Stryker, 2004: 3). The subject of emotions
is not, therefore, a being or body hermetically isolat-
ed from its environment, but is a subject who must
by necessity achieve its goals in relationship with
others and other things in its environment.
The complexity of  emotions
The apparent simplicity of human emotions hides
abundant complexities, problems and paradoxes.
The emotions a subject feels should never be con-
sidered as simple mechanical or physiological
responses to variations produced in the environ-
ment. As different theories have stressed, a subject’s
emotional experience depends on many factors:
How an act is evaluated consciously and/or uncon-
sciously; to whom or what the cause/responsibility
for an act is attributed; the subject’s expectations in
the situation; the subject’s active social identity at
each moment; and the subject’s identification with
other persons or groups.
According to appraisal theories of emotion (Brody,
1999: 23), human beings are not mere sentient bio-
logical mechanisms, as we cognitively evaluate the
elements in our environment before we experience
or express our emotions. Applying to all emotions
Freud’s (1948) idea that anxiety warns individuals of
a serious danger to their mental health, Hochschild
(1983) argues that emotions function as messengers
for the self; they carry out a signal function and are,
therefore, adaptive and useful in both the evolution-
ary long-term and the interactive short-term
(Stryker, 2004). But in addition to carrying out a sig-
nal function, emotional experiences also have an
impact and leave a mark, sometimes one that is
enduring and which conditions the future disposi-
tion of the subject.
According to attribution theories (Lawler et al.,
2008: 523), the emotion experienced does not
depend only on the event itself, but also on the
causal attribution made by the subject. If the indi-
vidual believes that someone else has been the cause
of an undesirable event, he/she will feel anger, and if
the subject believes him/herself to be the cause, the
response will be guilt or regret; finally, if the event is
perceived to be caused by fate, the response will be
sadness or despair (Brody, 1999: 24). 
According to expectation states theory (Turner and
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Stets, 2006: 36), the assessment of an object, event
or person will depend on the prior expectations of
the subject, which can affect the resulting emotional
experience. In the sphere of social interaction, a key
factor is if individuals meet the expectations awak-
ened in others based on their position of power or
status.
According to identity theories (Stryker, 2004),
which recognize and address the fact that both role
identities as well as social and group identities oper-
ate in culturally defined positions within the social
structure, emotions are also linked to the expecta-
tions that actors have in each social interaction: to
the extent that an interaction validates or does not
validate their identity they will feel positive or nega-
tive emotions (Burke and Stets, 2009).
Some theories, such as intergroup emotions theory,
show that the emotions subjects experience are the
result not only of what happens to them personally
but of what happens to the social groups to which
they belong and/or identify with (Devos et al., 2002;
Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Thus, as
Durkheim argued in The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life, group emotions and socially shared
emotions exist (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Braithwaite,
2004), as do processes of emotional contagion
(Hatfield et al., 1994). 
The complexity of human emotions is also a
result of the dialectic existing between emotional
experience and expression, the capacity that emo-
tions have to transmute and form successive emo-
tional structures, and the multiple compositions that
shape the nature of any affective state.
In the world of emotions, a fundamental distinc-
tion must be made between internal emotional expe-
rience (subjective feelings) and emotional expression
(the external manifestation of emotions). What we
feel can be expressed through words, facial expres-
sions, vocal tones, actions and physiological changes.
However, the existing relationship between internal
experience and external expression is confusing and
problematic (Brody, 1999). First, emotional expres-
sion cannot be reduced to the simple and mere man-
ifestation of an internal state, as expression, oriented
towards communication with another, emerges in
the context of social interaction (Marinetti et al.,
2011: 32). A little girl that falls may cry because she
has hurt herself, or she may cry because she wants
her parents’ attention. Second, it has not been
demonstrated that internal feelings produce physio-
logical or external bodily changes. For Damasio
(1994), it is the physiological changes that trigger
the feelings: we do not tremble because we feel
afraid; we feel afraid because we tremble. In short,
external manifestations have an emotion-expressive
function, but also a social communicative function
(Marinetti et al., 2011: 32).
The study of emotions is never simple, because
emotions are part of an active process and can under-
go multiple and enigmatic transmutations that are
both voluntary and involuntary, or conscious and
unconscious. Shame can become anger, happiness
can turn to weeping, pain into pleasure. Repression,
denial, displacement, projection, sublimation and
attribution are some of the defence mechanisms that
can alter our emotions (Turner, 2008: 326). In addi-
tion, it is obvious that we do not experience isolated
emotions, one at a time, nor do the emotions consti-
tute static states in time. Our emotional lives are
dynamic processes of multiple sequences and emotion-
al structures.
Finally, the complexity of emotions is also reflect-
ed in their composition. Scherer’s multicomponent
theory of emotions (2001) considers the following five
components: cognitive, neurophysiological, motiva-
tional, expressive and subjective. Shott (1979: 1318)
argues that at least two elements – physiological
arousal and cognitive labelling as affect – are neces-
sary for an actor to experience an emotion. Thoits
(1989: 318) distinguishes between appraisals of situ-
ational stimuli, physiological or bodily changes,
expressive gestures, and cultural labels applied to spe-
cific combinations of the first three components. In
short, subjective conscious feeling constitutes only
one of the essential elements involved in the experi-
ence of emotions.
The sociology of emotions
We have stated that the self, the individual organism,
is the central reference upon which emotions turn.
This being true there are two questions we must
answer: What can sociology contribute to the study
of emotions? Why should sociology integrate emo-
tions into its study of social reality? According to
Barbalet (1998: 8–9), sociology has something to say
about emotion for two reasons: first, because sociol-
ogy seeks to explain social phenomena, and emotion
is a social phenomenon, and second, because emo-
tion is necessary to explain the fundamentals of
social behaviour.
On the one hand, the sociological study of emo-
tions is grounded in the fact, indicated by Kemper
(1978, 1987), that the majority of our emotions
emerge, are experienced and have meaning in the
context of our social relations. Loneliness, envy, hate,
fear, shame, pride, resentment, revenge, nostalgia,
sadness, satisfaction, joy, anger, frustration and a
myriad of other feelings emerge in specific social 
situations, expressing in the individual’s bodily con-
sciousness the rich spectrum of forms of human
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social interaction and relationships. Understanding
an emotion means understanding the situation and
social relation that produces it.
On the other hand, the incorporation of emo-
tions into sociological studies involves investigating
and ‘theorizing all that becomes apparent when we
make the simple assumption that what we feel is
fully as important to the outcome of social affairs as
what we think or do’ (Hochschild, 1990: 117). An
actor whose consciousness is limited to ideas or cog-
nitions and lacking in social values or emotions is
inconceivable. For this reason, any description,
explanation or sociological understanding of a social
phenomenon is incomplete, and therefore false, if it
does not incorporate the feeling subject into its study
of structures and social processes (Bericat, 2000:
145).
In short, the sociology of emotions faces two fun-
damental tasks: studying the social nature of emo-
tions and studying the emotional nature of social
reality.
The social nature of  human emotions
The use of the sociological perspective is essential to
understand the innumerable emotions that make up
the affective universe of human beings. Despite the
implicit meaning in many of the metaphors used in
current language (Kövecses, 1990), emotions are
not, according to Gregory Bateson, a specific sub-
stance, but rather, patterns of relationship which link
the self with its environment, fundamentally with
others, in other words, with the social world (Burkitt,
2002: 151). Kemper’s social relational theory (1978)
argues that primary emotions are a product of the
outcome of interactions in two basic social dimen-
sions, power and status: fear is the outcome of an
interaction in which an actor is subject to a power
greater than his/her own; anger appears when we
believe someone else is responsible for denying us
merited status or prestige; depression emerges when
an actor loses status, but sees him or herself as
responsible for the loss; and finally, ‘satisfaction
results from interactions in which the power out-
come is nonthreatening’, and status outcomes are
similar to what was expected or desired (Kemper,
1987: 275).
Both the meaning and understanding of every
one of the innumerable feelings which form our
broad emotional universe are intimately connected
to specific relational patterns, in other words, to their
specific social nature. What we feel in a social situa-
tion will depend on the content and outcome of the
interaction, the balance we obtain from the
exchange, the type of social relationship that 
connects us to the other, the relevant norms and val-
ues and a broad set of other social factors. Thus, by
analysing the existing social structures and social fac-
tors which condition an emotion, and analysing the
expression, behaviour and social consequences stem-
ming from it, we can reach a greater understanding
of each emotion. Understanding the social life of
emotions and establishing adequate sociological defi-
nitions of them (Bericat, 2005) are essential to gain
understanding of not only the complex world of
emotions but also that of human beings in the con-
text of the processes and structures of social interac-
tion.
The emotional nature of  social reality
In all social phenomena, without exception, emo-
tions are present and play a fundamental role. This is
true in those collective phenomena in which intense
passion occupies a central place (e.g. festivals, sport-
ing competitions, the response to terrorist actions
and political revolutions), as well as in more intimate
social relations, such as within the family and in
friendships, which are charged with lasting though
often almost imperceptible feelings, and which give
flavour to every minor daily encounter. 
The two basic dimensions of sociability are the
symbolic or intercommunicative dimension and the
energetic or interactive dimension. Hence, social
reality is always culture, communication and con-
sciousness, and at the same time, structure, energy and
action. This is why emotions are a constituent part of
all social phenomena. Due to their informational
and expressive nature, emotions are one of the three
fundamental components of the intercommunica-
tive dimension of sociability (cognitions, values and
emotions). But due to their energetic and motiva-
tional nature, emotions are also determinants of
individual will, one of the three components of the
interactive dimension of sociability (natural energy,
social power and individual will). In short, emotions
are a constituent part of any social phenomenon,
whether it be conflict between partners (Retzinger,
1991), the Christmas season (Schervish et al., 1996),
the attack on September 11 (Burkitt, 2005; Kemper,
2002), comedy series on television (Weaver, 2010)
or trends in the stock market (Berezin, 2009).
This requires the development of a sociology
which studies the complex existing emotional struc-
tures and processes in the context of social life. As
Thoits (1989: 333–4) has pointed out, emotion con-
cepts are being incorporated as intervening variables
in substantive sociological research on such diverse
topics as charisma, gender roles, the division of
labour in the home, responses to stress, the reaction
of battered women to violence, group solidarity and
inequality in intimate relationships. The incorpora-
tion of emotions into this research makes it possible
to provide more specific and more detailed 
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explanations of these important social phenomena.
The place of  emotions in sociology
The sociology of emotions was born in the second
half of the 1970s, initiated by the research of three
pioneers: Arlie R Hochschild, Thomas J Scheff and
Theodor D Kemper (Bericat, 2000).
Hochschild was the first to use the term in 1975,
reflecting on the relationship between emotion and
gender. In 1979 she published an article in which,
through concepts such as feeling rules or emotion
work, she demonstrated the existing relationship
between culture, politics and emotions. The culture
defines what, when and how we should feel. In her
book, The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of
Human Feeling (1983), she analysed the emotion
management that must be carried out by certain serv-
ice workers, such as flight attendants. Scheff pub-
lished an article in 1977 in which he linked social
rituals to a process of emotional catharsis, and anoth-
er in 1988 in which he synthesized his sociological
theory of shame and pride. In Microsociology:
Discourse, Emotion and Social Structure (1990) he
presents an argument for incorporating emotions
into the core of sociological meta-theory, based on
the idea that maintaining social bonds is the most
important of human motivations. Kemper’s book, A
Social Interactional Theory of Emotions, published in
1978, presents his structural theory of emotions,
based on two basic dimensions of social interaction:
power and status. In an article from 1981, he sum-
marized a theoretical debate that emerged between
positivism and social constructivism, and in another
article from 1987 he tried to integrate both positions
by distinguishing between primary and secondary
emotions. In 1990 he edited an important collection
with contributions from many of the pioneers in the
sociology of emotions.
Included among these pioneers are: Collins
(1975, 1981), Heise (1979), Denzin (2009 [1984]),
Gordon (1981), Shott (1979), Thoits (1985, 1989),
Clark (1987), Hammond (1983) and Smith-Lovin
(Smith-Lovin and Heise, 1988). To these must be
added others, such as JH Turner, JE Stets and JM
Barbalet, who have expanded the body of literature
on the sociology of emotions through diverse and
important contributions over the last three decades.
During this time various academic journals have
dedicated special issues to the study of emotions:
Symbolic Interaction 1985, 8(2); Rationality and
Society 1993, 5(2); International Journal of Sociology
and Social Policy 1996, 16(9/10); Advances in Group
Processes 2004, 21; Journal of Social Issues 2007,
63(2); Theory and Society 2009, 38. In addition, 
several important collections have also been pub-
lished: Bendelow and Williams (1998), Barbalet
(2002), Stets and Turner (2006), Clay-Warner and
Robinson (2008) and Hopkins et al. (2009).
It is clear that since its birth, the sociology of
emotions has developed tremendously. However, if
social interaction and emotions are intimately
linked, as has been argued here, we must ask why the
sociology of emotions emerged so late. We should
also ask if sociology in its foundational or classical
epoch incorporated the emotions into its analysis.
A reading of the works of the classical sociolo-
gists, as well as those of other thinkers of the 19th
century, reveals that these first social scientists incor-
porated the emotions into their work in a sponta-
neous and natural manner. However, the gradual
advance of modern culture, the exclusive and exclud-
ing legitimacy that the positivist paradigm began to
acquire in the social sciences, and the hegemony ulti-
mately reached by cognitivism in the middle of the
20th century led to the almost complete disappear-
ance of the emotions in both social theory and
research. Only with postmodern social and cultural
change was the door opened to new approaches,
facilitating a re-encounter between the social sciences
and emotions. 
Although the major 19th-century social thinkers,
Marx (worker alienation), Durkheim (social rituals),
Weber (Protestant desire for love) and Freud (anxi-
ety), considered affective phenomena in their work
(Denzin, 2009 [1984]), emotions occupied a rela-
tively marginal analytical place, as can be seen in
Weber’s typology of social action. Only Charles H
Cooley, with his theory of the looking-glass self,
explicitly placed emotional dynamics at the centre of
social interaction (Turner and Stets, 2005: 106–7).
However, a detailed analysis of Suicide, by
Durkheim, and the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism of Weber reveals the significant role that
emotions play in these two paradigmatic sociological
studies. These authors also demonstrate that any
sociological theory that does not consider the emo-
tions involved in the social phenomena it is attempt-
ing to explain or understand will be
incomprehensible (Bericat, 2001a, 2001b).
What is, therefore, the place of emotions in soci-
ology? Schieman (2006: 493), in his work on anger,
emphasizes that an essential question for sociology is
the following: ‘What can we learn about social life by
studying anger?’ As we have seen, the analysis of any
emotion offers us a unique perspective from which
we can observe certain essential aspects of specifical-
ly human social interaction. However, despite the
great interest in understanding the social nature of
each of the emotions, the primary interest of the
sociologist should be to understand the emotional
nature of social life, in other words, the emotional
structure and dynamics present in the social 
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phenomena that are the object of study.
In conclusion, no sociological analysis should
exclude the emotions felt by participants in specific
phenomena, events, structures or social processes.
Theoretical approaches
With the objective of understanding and explaining
both emotions and the emotional dynamics of social
reality, sociologists have, over the last three decades,
developed a wide range of theoretical approaches.
Turner and Stets (2005, 2006) have classified these
into five major types:
a. Cultural theories see emotions not as mere bio-
logical responses but as social feelings.  These feel-
ings are conditioned by the culture of a society
(its norms, values, ideas, beliefs, etc.), emerge in
the course of patterned social interactions and are
learned through a socialization process (Gordon,
1981). Societies have an emotional culture, an
emotional vocabulary, feeling rules and display
rules, which define, for every situation and for
every social position a subject occupies, what
should be felt and how feelings should be
expressed (Hochschild, 1979, 1983). However,
although culture conditions our emotional expe-
riences and expression, it does not determine
them. Whether with the aim of adjusting to a
norm, managing emotional deviation (Thoits,
1985), adapting to a job, or obtaining an advan-
tage during a social interaction, individuals are
capable of strategically manipulating their emo-
tions (Hochschild, 1979, 1983) as well as their
expression (Goffman, 1959).
b. For symbolic interactionist theories, the identity
of the self constitutes the dynamic behind emo-
tional arousal. Individuals, at all times, try to
confirm both the image they have of themselves
(self-concept) and the particular identities
through which they act in any specific social
interaction (role identity). In Heise (1979) and
Smith-Lovin’s affect control theory, the emotional
dynamic stems from the existing degree of corre-
spondence between fundamental sentiments and
the transient feelings from a specific situation
(Smith-Lovin and Heise, 1988). When our self-
conception is confirmed by others, we experience
positive emotions; when it is negated, we experi-
ence negative emotions, such as distress, anxiety,
anger, shame or guilt (Burke and Stets, 2009;
Turner and Stets, 2006: 30). Stryker’s identity the-
ory (2004) emphasizes the existence of multiple
identities, some more important than others
depending on the social situation and the social
network in which they are activated (salience hier-
archy). For Cooley ([1964 [1902]), Goffman
(1956, 1959), Shott (1979), Hochschild (1979)
and Scheff (1988), the emotions that emerge dur-
ing social interactions play a fundamental role in
social control.
c. Ritual theories argue ‘that focused interaction,
which these theories refer to as ritual, is at the
heart of all social dynamics. Rituals generate
group emotions that are linked to symbols, form-
ing the basis for beliefs, thinking, morality, and
culture’ (Summers-Effler, 2006: 135). Taking the
sacrificial rituals of aboriginal Australians as a
paradigm, Durkheim (1965 [1912]) described
the basic mechanisms through which these col-
lective events produced and maintained the social
cohesion of the group. Rituals are social gatherings
in which individuals maintain the same focus of
attention, share the same values and feel the same
emotions (Collins, 2004; Knottnerus, 2010).
These social gatherings provoke a collective effer-
vescence and a high level of group consciousness.
Collins (1981, 2004) distinguishes between the
positive emotions and moral feelings, which,
directed towards the group itself, shape social sol-
idarity, and the positive emotions and trust that
individual participants feel in the form of emo-
tional energy (EE). According to Collins, individ-
uals always seek to maximize their emotional
energy in every social encounter. Goffman
(1959) grounded his social research project in
this initial Durkheimian insight, stating that all
social encounters constitute an interaction ritual.
d. Structural theories of emotions, whose initial for-
mulation we owe to TD Kemper (1978), explain
the type of emotion felt by actors in the course of
social interaction, focusing on specific relational
characteristics. According to Kemper, there are
two basic relational dimensions: power and status.
Actors with power, or who gain power in an
interaction, experience positive emotions such as
satisfaction, confidence and security, while actors
with a low level of relative power experience neg-
ative emotions such as fear. Actors with a high
level of status, or to whom others give deference,
will feel positive emotions such as pride, while
those that lack status, or lose it, will feel negative
emotions such as shame. Thamm (2004) propos-
es universalizing Kemper’s social relational theory
by specifying with greater detail the structural
conditions associated with specific emotional
responses. These depend on whether the Self and
the Other meet their expectations, and whether
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they are rewarded as a result of interaction.
Barbalet (1998) has developed a structural theory
of emotions from a macro-sociological perspec-
tive.
e. Exchange theories, developed by George C
Homans and Peter M Blau, have also been used
to explain the complex world of emotions
(Lawler, 1999). Social interaction is a process in
which actors exchange valuable resources in order
to obtain an advantage or benefit. Individuals try
to obtain rewards or avoid punishments by max-
imizing the utility of their behaviour and calcu-
lating costs and investments (Turner and Stets,
2005: 180). Individuals ‘feel good’ (positive rein-
forcement) when rewards exceed costs and invest-
ments, and they ‘feel bad’ (negative
reinforcement) when they do not. But the inten-
sity and type of emotions provoked by a social
exchange depend on many other factors: the type
of exchange (productive, negotiated, reciprocal or
generalized); the characteristics of the structure
and the nature of social networks (degree of coor-
dination involved in the exchange, density of the
network); the relative power and dependency of
the actors; whether or not expectations are met;
the relevant norms of justice (for example, equi-
ty, equality and procedure); and to what individ-
uals attribute the cause of the outcome of
exchange (the self, the other or others, the social
unit, or the task in itself ) (Lawler, 2001; Turner
and Stets, 2006: 41). Lawler’s affect theory of
social exchange ‘introduces an emoting actor,
specifically, an actor who responds emotionally to
exchange and who attempts to understand the
source of their emotions and feelings’ (Lawler,
2001: 347).
Emotions and sociological analysis 
That affective life constitutes, prima facie, a bodily
reality rooted in the biology of individual organisms,
can explain why the sociology of emotions has expe-
rienced its greatest development up until now in the
micro-sphere of social phenomena. In addition, the
fact that the emotional life of human beings consti-
tutes such a subjective, labile and fluid reality, could
explain the predominance of theoretical reflection
over empirical research, as well as the insufficient
development of research methodologies and tech-
niques especially adapted to the sociological study of
emotions.
However, since the birth of the sociology of emo-
tions, the micro-analyses have always contained an
evident macro-projection, and the theoretical reflec-
tion an implicit, although under-developed, empiri-
cal vocation. As a result, the progress made in the
past provides an excellent basis for the future devel-
opment of a sociology of emotions in which macro-
analysis and empirical research will have a more
prominent role.
The sociological analysis of  emotions
The evident macro-sociological and empirical pro-
jection of the micro-sociological theories of Kemper,
Scheff and Collins can illustrate a necessary path for
integrating micro- and macro-analyses.
Although Kemper’s theory begins with the analy-
sis of a concrete situation in which two individual
actors interact, it predicts the resulting emotions
based on the two basic structural dimensions of
sociability. These emotions are not a result of the
individuals’ biological nature, but of the power/sta-
tus associated with their social positions and the vari-
ations in power/status they experience in the course
of the social interaction. In the same way, social
actors’ emotional energy (EE), produced in every
micro-social encounter, whether of a hierarchical
(power) or egalitarian (status) character, is the result
of the structurally accumulated energy in interaction
ritual chains (Collins, 1981). For Scheff (1994: 4),
who studies episodes of shame and rage in micro-
scopic detail, the analysis of the parts and the whole
(part/whole analysis) ‘places equal emphasis on the
smallest parts of a social system, the words and ges-
tures in discourse, and the largest wholes, the insti-
tutions that exist within and between nations’.
Thus, the sociological importance given to fear
and rage, on the one hand, and shame and pride, on
the other, are explained, not so much by their impor-
tance in individuals’ psychic lives, but by the funda-
mental role they play in the social structure and in
social dynamics. Fear and rage are the central emo-
tions in the interactive dimension of sociability
(power), while shame and pride are the central emo-
tions in the intercommunicative dimension (status).
Fear constitutes a broad emotional family com-
posed of feelings such as worry, anxiety, panic, terror
or horror, which differ both in content and in inten-
sity. According to Kemper (1978, 1987), individuals
feel guilt if they perceive themselves to possess excess
power, and they feel fear-anxiety if they lack suffi-
cient power. For Barbalet (1998: 161), fear indicates
that the future interests of the actor are threatened.
In this sense, Hume (1911 [1739]) pointed out that
both fear and hope depend on the likelihood that an
event will happen, a desirable event in the case of
hope, and an undesirable event in the case of fear.
Barbalet (1998) distinguishes between the cause of
fear, which is vulnerability and an actor’s relative lack
of power in relation to something out in the world,
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and the object of fear, which is the expectation of
suffering harm.
Anger is the node for an extensive family of emo-
tions which range from simple annoyance, to indig-
nation, to rage or fury. It is most often stimulated by
perceived or real insult, injustice, betrayal, lack of
equality, obstacles to achievement, incompetence
and physical aggression (Schieman, 2006: 496).
Anger emerges when an individual loses power or
status and when this loss is considered remediable
and another actor is considered responsible (Kemper,
1990). Anger activates the power dimension in the
form of hostility or aggression of the self towards the
other, who is considered responsible for a negative or
unjustified outcome. There are four forms of anger:
frustration (because of undesirable outcomes),
resentment (because of outcomes which benefit oth-
ers), reproach (attributing blame to others) and
anger itself (for undesirable outcomes in which
blame is attributed to others) (Clore et al., 1993:
68).
Scheff argues that shame and pride are social emo-
tions for antonomasia. Cooley’s theory of the looking-
glass self conceives the human being as always
adopting the role of the other, arguing that we always
see and evaluate ourselves from an external perspec-
tive. This basic mechanism of sociability involves
three steps: the first is imagining how we appear to
the other; the second is imagining how the other
judges this appearance; and the final step is a
response based on what we think of this judgement
in the form of a feeling such as pride or shame
(Cooley, 1964 [1902]). Any encounter can become
embarrassing for any participant (Goffman, 1956:
265), who can suffer a loss of face and feel ashamed.
Scheff ’s theory of shame is based on the assumption of
the ‘maintenance of bonds as the most crucial
human motive’ (Scheff, 1990: 4). There are secure
and insecure bonds. Secure bonds produce solidarity,
and insecure bonds, alienation. In each encounter
our bond with the other can be ‘built, maintained,
repaired or damaged’ (Scheff, 1994: 1). Shame and
pride constitute a ‘gyroscope’ which informs the
individual of the state of his or her social bonds. We
feel legitimate pride when the bond is secure, and
shame, a very painful emotion, when we are rejected
by or lose worth in the eyes of the other.
The system of social control is effective thanks to
the compelling force of these four key emotions.
However, as can be seen in the emotional classifica-
tions developed by different authors (Kemper, 1987;
Ortony et al., 1988; Plutchik, 1980), many emo-
tions still remain to be analysed. Social scientists
have contributed to the understanding of some, such
as, for example, confidence (Barbalet, 1998, 2009;
Dunning and Fetchenhauer, 2010; Luhmann,
1979), empathy and sympathy (Clark, 1987; Smith,
1976 [1759]), grief and sadness (Gharmaz and
Millingan, 2006), boredom (Barbalet, 1999) and
disgust (Douglas, 2002).
The emotions in sociological analysis
Sociology has incorporated, and must continue
incorporating in its different areas of study, the
analysis of three types of emotions: (a) interactional
emotions, that is, the dispositions, states and emo-
tional processes related to the different positions that
actors occupy in the social structure; (b) group and
collective emotions, that is, those that subjects experi-
ence or express by being a member of a group or
forming part of a collective in a specific social situa-
tion; and (c) emotional climates and societal emotions,
that is, the general and lasting moods or states of
emotion rooted in the essential characteristics of a
specific society or social unit.
First, bearing in mind that emotions can only
exist in the body of individual organisms, sociology
must study the emotions experienced by individuals
as actors who occupy certain social positions. Thus,
for example, anger is assumed to be a ‘masculine
emotion’, one which women should repress (Brody,
1999; Hochschild, 1975). Those who occupy higher
positions of power express anger more easily, while
those that are in subordinate positions try to control
their anger (Schieman, 2006: 508). ‘Because of the
greater ability of those in power to define situations,
including emotional ones, depression and anxiety
often come to replace anger in the experience of sub-
ordinate actors’ (Freund, 1990: 467). However,
anger, rage and indignation form part of the moral
emotions (Stets et al., 2008), which are provoked by
injustice, the violation of norms, social deviation and
guilt. This explains their presence in both moral pan-
ics and social movements (Berry, 1999; Jasper,
2011).
The sociology of gender has studied emotional
differences based on gender in great detail.
Traditional cultures and societies associate women
with emotionality, excluding men from the world of
feelings. Women are encouraged to feel and express
powerless emotions, such as fear and sadness, while
men, on the other hand, must repress and hide these
emotions, instead feeling and expressing powerful
emotions such as anger and pride (Brody, 1999;
Shields et al., 2006). Both the conceptual 
approaches (feeling and expression rules, emotion
management, surface and deep acting) and the
empirical research of Arlie R Hochschild (1975,
1983, 2003), carried out using participant observa-
tion, content analysis and unstructured interviews,
have had a tremendous impact on the development
of sociologies of gender and work. The role that
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emotions play in work or in the culture of the work-
place, the emotional content of different occupa-
tions, the social and personal consequences of
emotion management and the emotional structure
of the workplace in comparison with the family have
been the object of many studies (Clay-Warner and
Robinson, 2008; Hochschild, 2003; Wharton,
2009). 
Second, individuals experience and express group
emotions and collective emotions because they are
members of a group or form part of a collective in a
determined social situation. For example, fear often
emerges in social contexts, not as a mere individual
reaction to a threat, but as the result of an intersub-
jective experience. ‘Thus, the conception of fear as
an individual reaction to physical threat offers very
little for an understanding of social behavior and
action’ (Barbalet: 1998: 153).
The sociology of social movements has been an
area in which the analysis of group and collective
emotions has made an important contribution,
deepening knowledge of specific social movements
as well as leading to theoretical renewal in the fields
of public opinion and political action (Jasper, 2011).
Many emotions, such as indignation, moral shock,
anger, fear, shame, pride and humiliation, condition
and inspire social movements, whether in their ori-
gin, recruitment of members, maintenance of organ-
ization or in the struggle to achieve their objectives.
Emirbayer and Goldberg (2005) theorize collective
action and social movements, incorporating emo-
tions based on the rejection of three erroneous pos-
tulates: that reason and emotion are mutually
exclusive, that emotions are individual states of
mind, that collective emotions lack analytical auton-
omy.
Lastly, it is clear that the basic structure and
processes of a society create specific emotional cli-
mates, or even societal emotions, which condition the
general sentiments of the population (Bar-Tal et al.,
2007; De Rivera, 1992). In this sense, a sociology of
any emotion, such as for example, a sociology of fear,
must analyse the cultural matrix in which fear
emerges and address the patterns of social action
commonly associated with it (Barbalet, 1998; Tudor,
2003: 244). Helena Flam (1998), using biographical
interviews as her research technique, studied the role
of fear in the communist regimes of Poland and East
Germany. Thomas Scheff, using the microscopic
analysis of verbal content and paralinguistic and
visual behaviour, studied the role of shame in micro
family conflicts and in the macro violence of the two
world wars (Scheff, 1994).
Every emotion can be an essential component of
very diverse social phenomena. For example, fear
plays an important role in terrorism (Burkitt, 2005),
unemployment (Barbalet, 1998: 158), the circula-
tion of elites (Barbalet, 1998: 161), consumption
(Miller, 1998), politics (Marcus, 2000), social move-
ments (Jasper, 2011) and the economy (Berezin,
2009). However, it could be argued that today fear
also constitutes a societal emotion, in other words, an
emotion that essentially characterizes the ethos of our
postmodern societies. The culture of fear (Furedi,
1997), or the culture of horror analysed by Bericat
(2005) using micro- and macro-analyses of the emo-
tional content of the news published in North
American newspapers, stems from characteristics
which are essential aspects of our society as a risk
society (Beck, 1992) and a liquid society (Bauman,
2006). Every society or social unit fosters, in every
age, specific characteristic emotions.
In short, through analysing the emotions
involved in social phenomena, sociology has broad-
ened, deepened and renewed knowledge in different
areas of study. The following particularly stand out:
the sociology of gender (Brody, 1999; Shields et al.,
2006), work (Clay-Warner and Robinson, 2008;
Grandey et al., 2012; Hochschild, 1975, 1983,
2003; Wharton, 2009), organizations (Fineman,
2008), social movements (Emirbayer and Goldberg,
2005; Flam and King, 2005; Jasper, 2011) and mass
media (Döveling et al., 2011; Knottnerus, 2010).
Future directions
Although the sociology of emotions has developed a
rich set of concepts, perspectives and theories, con-
tradictions and inconsistencies remain; this calls for
a greater degree of integration. As in other fields, the
paradoxes or inconsistencies highlight problems, the
resolution of which lead to advances in knowledge.
The sociology of emotions should address and seek
to resolve these multiple paradoxes and theoretical
problems.
Up until now, the sociology of emotions has car-
ried out one-dimensional and static analyses of the
emotional lives of human beings, and for this reason,
they are often too simple and even mechanical. For
example, many specific emotions have been
analysed, but it is obvious that individuals do not
feel emotions in an isolated and independent man-
ner. The feelings we experience are part of complex
emotional structures consisting of many emotions. In
addition, emotional experiences happen over time as
sequences or emotion chains that have a particular
emotional dynamic.
The sociology of emotions has made greater
advances in the development of broad meta-
theoretical perspectives than in contributing sub-
stantive theories on concrete phenomena and social
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emotional processes, or in carrying out empirically
valid and reliable research. The development of rele-
vant, quality empirical research is therefore indispen-
sable for the advancement of this sub-discipline. As a
result, it is critical to adapt available research tech-
niques to the social analysis of emotions. 
The sociology of emotions in both its theoretical
development and in its empirical studies has, up
until now, focused more on the structures and
processes of micro-interactions than on social emo-
tional macro-phenomena. Although this shortcom-
ing has recently been recognized and efforts to
address it are being made, it is evident that a macro-
sociology of emotions remains to be developed.
Annotated further reading
Barbalet J (1998) Emotion, Social Theory, and Social
Structure: A Macrosociological Approach. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
A very important, pioneering contribution in the
field of the macro-sociology of emotions, in which
different social phenomena related with the emotions
of resentment, confidence, shame and fear are
analysed.
Clay-Warner J and Robinson DT (eds) (2008) Social
Structure and Emotion. London: Elsevier.
A very complete collection of high quality articles
about status-power, work identity, exchange relations,
justice and moral emotions, emotional labour and
social change.
Hochschild AR (1983) The Managed Heart:
Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
A classic work of the sociology of emotions in which
the author analyses the function of feelings,
emotional norms and the management of emotions
in both the private world of interpersonal
relationships and in the public sphere of the
workplace. A study on the emotional work
demanded in many jobs, such as flight attendants.
See also Hochschild (1979).
Hopkins D, Kleres J, Flam H and Kuzmics H (eds)
(2009) Theorizing Emotions: Sociological Explorations
and Applications. New York: Verlag.
A very complete collection of high quality articles
with contributions from diverse micro- and macro-
theoretical perspectives, and which treats diverse
social emotional phenomena.
Kemper TD (1978) A Social Interactional Theory of
Emotions. New York: Wiley.
In this pioneering book, Kemper develops his social
interactional theory of emotion. He demonstrates the
existence of a link between the structural position of
each actor in relation to the other and the emotions
that emerge in the process of interaction. The basic
social dimensions that define structural position are
power and status. See also Kemper (1987).
Scheff TJ (1990) Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and 
Social Structure. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
This book includes some of the most important
work carried out by Scheff in the early development
of the sociology of emotions, such as his theory of
shame. It offers a paradigm which incorporates
emotions in the very centre of sociology. See also
Scheff (1988).
Stets JE and Turner JH (eds) (2006) Handbook of the
Sociology of Emotions. Boston, MA: Springer.
A very complete collection of high quality articles
about basic emotional processes, theoretical
perspectives, the analysis of singular emotions and
social emotional phenomena.
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résumé  Les émotions que les êtres humains éprouvent jouent un rôle fondamental dans tous les
phénomènes sociaux. En conséquence, la sociologie doit intégrer l’analyse des émotions dans ses objets
d’étude. Ce développement a commencé il y a trois décennies avec la naissance de la sociologie des
émotions. Cet article propose une introduction générale et critique du travail des sociologues des émotions
ont effectué jusqu’à présent.
mots-clés des sentiments ◆ l’interaction sociale ◆ sociologie des émotions ◆ la structure sociale ◆
la théorie sociologique
resumen Las emociones que experimentan los seres humanos juegan un papel fundamental en todos
los fenómenos sociales. Por este motivo, la sociología debe incorporar el análisis de las emociones a sus
objetos de estudio. Este proceso de incorporación comenzó hace tres décadas con el nacimiento de la
sociología de las emociones. El presente artículo ofrece una visión de conjunto, introductoria y crítica, del
trabajo realizado hasta ahora por los sociólogos de las emociones.
palabras clave estructura social ◆ interacción social ◆ sentimientos ◆ sociología de las emociones ◆
teoría sociológica
